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
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BRETON, G. LEOTTI, SALMON, AND WINTROBE

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CHAPTER 11

Regulating nations and ethnic communities

Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry[1]

National and ethnic conflict is a persistent feature of modernity and will continue to be so despite intermittently fashionable theories that assert otherwise.

The last decade has seen seismic changes in the relations between national and ethnic communities around the world. Most spectacularly the disintegrations of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia burst asunder the borders of the communist empires – and what was Ethiopia will probably imitate them. Much of the conventional political wisdom about nationality and ethnicity collapsed with these empires. For instance, it had been widely maintained that the international (for which read the interstate) system had stabilized the borders of the world's states, so that secessions and the redrawing of territorial frontiers through conquest or partitions were phenomena of previous ages (see Mayall 1990). The aftermath of World War II and the decolonization of Europe's empires had allegedly carved states' borders in stone, and many concurred with the verdict that "the twentieth-century bias against political divorce, that is, secession, is just about as strong as the nineteenth-century bias against marital divorce" (Huntingdon 1972). The forging of the states of Israel and Bangladesh through war and insurrection, Indonesia's conquests of East Timor and West Irian, and India's invasion of Goa were merely exceptions that proved the rule.

Today we all should know that the stability of state borders after 1945 (or 1960) owed more to the geopolitics of the Cold War than to

[1] The authors thank Brian Barry, Alan Beattie, Patrick Dunleavy, Christopher Hood, Tom Nossiter, David Schiff, and all the participants in the Villa Colombella Group, especially Ronald Finlay, Russell Hardin, Paul Seabright, and Ron Wintrobe for their critical commentary. They are individually and severally liable for the remaining errors.

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the triumph of particular norms of "international law." While it remains (to be seen whether the "new international order" proclaimed over the rubble of the cities of Kuwait and Baghdad presages a new stabilization of the world's territorial frontiers, the sages of "international relations" and the prophets of postmodernity have had their wings clipped. The urge of nations to be states and the capacities of states to create nations, intentionally or otherwise, are not diminishing. Saddam Hussein's adventurism may have been the first and least successful of a new round of state-and nation-building projects that will owe more to conquest than consent. Many Serbians at least appear to have made this calculation.

The renewed instability of state frontiers is merely one symptom of the global political power of national and ethnic consciousness. The last two decades have seen the final collapse of white settler regimes in Africa (in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe), and the South African system of apartheid, the last bastion of European settler domination in Africa, hovers on the verge of negotiated extinction. Yet during the same period new systems of ethnic domination have been established around the world, by native Melanesians in Fiji, by Morocco in the Western Sahara, by Israelis in what was Palestine; and attempts to establish such regimes have led to protracted "civil" wars, notably in Uganda and Sudan. And the fear (or pretext) that open, multiparty democracies would degenerate into ethnic contests for state power, put much of postcolonial Africa and considerable portions of Asia and Latin America under one-party dictatorships or military rule. Other parts of the world appear trapped in deadlocked ethnic wars, where no faction is sufficiently powerful to control or crush completely its opponent(s): for example, Burma/Myanmar (Smith 1991) and Peru.

National and ethnic conflict have not been confined to areas of the world characterized by economic underdevelopment. To the contrary: Since the 1960s separatist and autonomist movements have flourished in Corsica, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Catalonia, and Quebec, that is, in regions of the "advanced West." In happier Western zones ethnic communities have been able to negotiate agreed changes to their political systems, notably in Belgium, Switzerland, and the South Tyrol; and some proclaim the European Community is a successful case of the transcendence of national conflicts. There remains nevertheless a twilight world of nations and ethnic communities alternating between deadlocked war and permanent negotiation: Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka fit this description. The Balkans are joining them, again. As this chapter was composed, Bosnia, Canada, Cyprus, Israel/

Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa were the subjects and objects of inter-ethnic and international (in both senses) negotiations about their governmental futures.

Do all these national and ethnic phenomena have common causes and connections? Can we understand both their genesis and their consequence? These questions can be answered in the affirmative, but they are not our concern here. Instead we concentrate on the macropolitical methods used to manage or eliminate national and ethnic conflict.

Scientific endeavors, as conventionally understood, are built upon theories and hypotheses, evidence and experiments. Scientific development is conventionally measured by successful precision in prediction and postdiction[2] and by the development of quantified indicators of the phenomena being examined or explained. The study of national and ethnic conflict and conflict management have not always met these positivist ideals of social science,[3] and we cannot hope to make good these deficiencies here. Instead we attempt a humbler task, that of classification, the necessary precursor of scientific theory and empirical verification and falsification.

This chapter nevertheless has positive and normative functions. The taxonomy of eight modes of ethnic-conflict resolution, developed below, should facilitate research on whether there are "laws of motion" that govern the forms of national and ethnic-conflict regulation: regularities that enable the "postdiction" (if not the prediction) of the circumstances under which particular strategies for managing conflict will be attempted, and successfully implemented. Normative concerns are also present: We evaluate the merits of the different forms of conflict regulation to establish whether multinational and multiethnic states can be stabilized in ways that are compatible with liberal democratic values and institutions.

We present below a taxonomy of the macropolitical[4] forms of ethnic-conflict regulation, leaving its further refinement to future work

[2] The discipline of economics may be an exception: Its practitioners thrive on the failure of forecasts

[3] Pioneering works have been carried out by Walker Connor (1971) and Donald Horowitz (1985), and most notably by Arend Lijphart (1977, 1984).

[4] Macropolitical forms of conflict-regulation are smaller scale and include inter alia discrimination and segregation, public demographic policies, immigration policies, equal opportunities policies, affirmative action programs, community relations and cultural encounter promotions, specific forms of electoral representation, and so on. Micropolitical policies are the tools of macropolitical objectives

(McGarry and O'Leary, forthcoming). The term "regulation" is inclusive, covering both conflict termination and conflict management. Eight distinct macro methods of national- and ethnic-conflict regulation can be distinguished, to wit:

Methods for elimination of differences
  genocide
  forced mass population transfers
  partition and/or secession (self-determination)
  integration and/or assimilation
Methods for managing differences
  hegemonic control
  arbitration (third-party intervention)
  cantonization/federalism
  consociation or power sharing

This is a taxonomy, and not a typology: the classification of entities by logical types.[5] It was arrived at simply through researching cases of ethnic-conflict termination and regulation, and putting together "likes with likes."[6]

This taxonomy does not suggest Linnaeus-like discreteness or exhaustiveness. Often the eight modes are found in combination and targeted at the same national or ethnic group(s), or, alternatively, different strategies are aimed at different ethnic groups within the same state. Thus the Nazis practiced genocide, mass population transfers and hegemonic control of Jews. Stalin executed genocide, mass population transfers, and hegemonic control of multiple ethnic groups. Yugoslavia under Tito employed elements of control, arbitration, and consociation. Oliver Cromwell offered Irish Catholics a choice between genocide and forced mass population transfer. They could go "To Hell or Connaught!" The United States practiced genocide on Native Americans, integration of immigrant Europeans, and control of

[5] Typologies are heuristics used to codify existing knowledge. Good typologies are simple, constructed through the use of logical antonyms rather than empirical observation, and provide a fruitful basis for further theoretical development and empirical investigation. Taxonomy by contrast is the classification of organisms and originated with the Swedish scientist Linnaeus. Taxonomists aim to place all organisms in a hierarchical classification scheme in which, to put it very crudely, "likes" are classified with "likes." Taxonomies, unlike typologies, are empirical rather than ideal-typical, a posteriori rather than a priori categories.

[6] Although the eight methods were arrived at taxonomically, two of them are typologically related, namely consociationalism and control (Lustick 1979), and arbitration (or third-party intervention) can be typologically contrasted with them (McGarry and O'Leary, forthcoming).

black Americans in the Deep South. Contemporary Israel practices consociationalism among Jews of different ethnic origins but control over Palestinians; it executed forced mass population transfers in the past and may do so again. Settler colonialists often permit some combination of genocide, mass population transfers, assimilation, and hegemonic control. Belgium has practiced consociationalism to regulate divisions between its "spiritual families" and federalism to resolve tensions between its linguistic communities.

However, this taxonomy is logically divisible between modes of conflict regulation that seek to eliminate or terminate national or ethnic differences, and those that seek to manage the consequences of differences. Thus genocide, mass population transfers, partition/secession, and integration/assimilation are political strategies that seek to eliminate (or radically reduce) differences, at least within a given state. By contrast strategies that manage differences include control, arbitration, federalism/cantonization, and consociationalism.[7]

It is possible to rank the eight methods in the taxonomy normatively, but not to construct a simple or lexicographic moral hierarchy (unless one adopts Kantian cosmopolitanism). We do not think it is justifiable to say that either difference-eliminating or difference-managing methods are inherently ethically superior.

Of the difference-eliminating strategies there are moral justifications for partition/secession (e.g. Barry 1991c; Beran 1987; Buchanan 1991) and arguments for integration (assimilation) (Buchanan 1991) that have been advanced by generations of liberals and socialists. But there is no obvious moral hierarchy that enables people to claim that integration is better than partition (or vice versa), unless there is widespread consent for one option rather than the other – where widespread consent refers to substantial majorities within all the relevant ethnic communities. The merits of partition/secession as against integration/assimilation must be decided by political argument and pragmatic considerations, such as feasibility and estimates about long-run efficacy. There is nothing morally weighty to be said in favor of genocide or forced mass-population transfers, the other difference-eliminating strategies, although "ethical" arguments have usually accompanied the implementation of these gruesome projects.

Of the difference-managing strategies one, hegemonic control, should be morally unacceptable to liberals. The rest (arbitration, can-

[7] Eliminating and managing differences are mutually exclusive strategies from the perspective of the target community. However, states may seek to eliminate differences between some communities while seeking to manage differences between others.

tomization/federalism, and consociationalism) are compatible with democratic norms, although there are critics of the democratic quality of consociational practices (e.g., Barry 1991a, b; Lustick 1979; Glazer 1987). Advocacy of the merits of federalism/cantonization, consociation, and arbitration must, however, be tempered by empirical judgments about their feasibility and long-term efficacy.

Methods for eliminating differences

Genocide

The first two extreme and terminal "solutions" to national and ethnic conflict are the most abhorrent: genocide and forced mass population transfers. They often go together. Genocide literally means the killing of a race or kind. There is some controversy as to how the concept should be used, either legally or by social scientists (e.g., Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Kuper 1981).[8] We believe it should be employed only in cases where the victims share (real or alleged) national or ascriptive traits, whereas Harff's useful term *politicide* should be employed for the systematic mass killing of people who may or may not share ascriptive traits (Harff 1992).[9]

Genocide then is the systematic mass killing of a national or ethnic collectivity (however defined), or the indirect destruction of such a community through the deliberate termination of the conditions that permit its biological and social reproduction. On this definition appalling genocides were perpetrated by the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s and within the communist bloc in Eurasia. The European colonizers of the Americas, and Russians and Turks in the czarist and Ottoman empires also perpetrated genocides by this definition.

Genocide is still practiced; indeed, in absolute terms the twentieth century has been more genocidal than its predecessors. Only confident optimists believe that genocide has become outmoded because of the

- [8] "Genocide" was coined to describe the systematic destruction of Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs by the Nazis (Lemkin 1944).
- [9] The UN *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1948) defines it as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such" (Article II). The article's subclauses include "(a) killing members of the group, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." There is much debate over whether subclause (b) is too inclusive.

triumph of universal norms in what some sociologists are pleased to call "late modernity." The infamy won by Hitler and Stalin notwithstanding genocide has not become unthinkable.[10] Since 1945 there have been genocides perpetrated in the Soviet Union (of the Chechens, the Ingushi, the Karachai, the Balkars, the Meskhetians, and the Crimean Tartars[?]); in Burundi (of Hutu); in Iraq (of the Kurds); in Paraguay (of the Ache Indians); in Indonesia (of the Chinese[?] and the indigenous population of East Timor); in Nigeria (of Ibo residents in the North); in Equatorial Guinea (of the Bubi); in Uganda (of the Karamojong, the Acholi, the Lango, Nilotic tribes, and the Bagandans); in Pakistan (of the Bengalis in what became Bangladesh); in Burma (of Muslims in border regions); in Iran (of Kurds and Baha' is); and it appears in Bosnia (of Muslims).

Genocides are usually one-sided – indeed some would say this is one of their defining features (Jonassohn 1992, 19) – and they are intended to terminate national or ethnic conflict. Do they have an economic function? In the construction of many empires it can be said that genocides "worked" instrumentally: They secured the relevant territories for imperial rulers and colonial settlers. In other cases the instrumental rationality of genocides is not at all obvious: European Jews were the victims of the most atrocious genocide in World War II, and the Armenians and others suffered grievously in World War I. In both cases the perpetrators resolved on final solutions, believing it would "purify" their national cultures and stabilize their empires.[11]

- [10] Recently McNeill (1986, 71) argued that Hitler's genocides of Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs had decisively tainted advocacy of the ideal of ethnic unity within an existing state.
- [11] Some believe that these were cases of forced transfers rather than genocide because Stalin's express intention was to remove these peoples from militarily sensitive areas and not to kill them. However, by the "indirect destruction" element in our definition (and that of the UN), they count as genocides.
- [12] The Chinese were (conveniently) treated as coterminous with communists: So it is difficult to distinguish genocide from politicide in Indonesia. Estimates of the number of victims during 1965 to 1966 range from 500,000 to 1,000,000.
- [13] That the Armenians were the victims of Turkish genocide has been challenged by Turks and others who maintain that "those who question the 'Armenian genocide' are very different from those who question the genocide of the Jews by Hitler and his Nazis" and include "the foremost experts on the history of Turkey in the United States" (McCarthy 1989, 97). But, sadly, it is normal for genocides to be denied by the perpetrators or their descendants. Modern Turks cannot bear to think their ancestors behaved in a an extremely brutal fashion in 1916; and their historical apologists concentrate on the (accurate) claim that the Armenians were preparing to seek autonomy and to use violence, as if these arguments excuse genocide. For discussions of the genocide of Armenians, see inter alia Hovannisian, ed. (1986; 1992), and the Permanent People's Tribunal (1985).

Genocides often fail to achieve their objectives. Naturally they create explosive and historically entrenched bitterness and fear among survivors and the descendants of victims. Serb–Croat relations in what was Yugoslavia are inflamed by memories of wartime genocide during World War II. If Russians and indigenous groups in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan are to coexist peacefully lots of skeletons have to remain buried. The state of Israel's "siege mentality" owes its existence to a reaction against the Nazi genocide of Jews.[14] Moreover, one of the consequences in a community that has undergone genocide is a high birthrate, which shifts a political conflict downstream to the next generation.

Although it is not something we can examine at length here, it is possible to identify circumstances under which genocide is likely to be contemplated. *State genocide* is more likely to occur when:

- An empire is being constructed and maintained (when genocide is used as a deliberate policy of land acquisition and mass terrorization).
- An ethnic community lacks geopolitical resources (its own state or a powerful diaspora).
- A subordinate ethnic community is left vulnerable within a disintegrating system of control (whether organized by an empire or a party dictatorship).
- A given ethnic community (e.g., Jews, Ibos, Armenians, overseas Chinese) possesses economic superiority and cultural identifiability in conditions of industrialization, but lacks military and political power (Gellner 1983, 105).
- A given ethnic community is convinced that its position is one of "kill or be killed";
- The relevant state is not democratic.[15]

Frontier genocide is a concomitant of colonization and conquest, but by contrast may not be directly implemented by state officials. It is likely to occur when settlers, possessed of technologically superior resources, displace natives from their access to land and have few incentives to make natives into dependent laborers: Indeed to protect

[14] The Israeli state was founded through the mass expulsion of Palestinian Arabs, and their systematic maltreatment has radicalized them, making conflict resolution even more problematic. In response to the Israeli-organized Palestinian catastrophe, some Palestinians wish to execute full-scale retribution, by driving Israelis "into the sea." However, frontier genocides occurred in all the parliamentary colonies of the British empire. Indeed, one definition of a "white dominion" is that it was where settlers practiced genocide against indigenous peoples.

their position as free farmers they may have every reason to eliminate potential competition.

These conditions are facilitative, not necessary. A necessary condition for genocide appears to be the presence of a racial, ethnic, or religious ideology that sanctions a nonuniversalist conception of the human species and makes mass murder easier to accomplish. These belief systems may be more important than technological capacities for managing mass killings, as it is the discipline of the killers, rather than their instruments, that may best account for the scale of genocides. The Old Testament God of the Jews (and subsequently of the Christians and Muslims) could be used to sanction the extermination of peoples long before Nazi racism. Some have argued that ideological (as opposed to imperial) genocides are modern: Beginning in the religious wars of the Middle Ages they have been carried further by the spread of nationalist and Marxist-Leninist doctrines. We do not agree. Genocides can be instrumental and "preemptive" as well as being ideological: Indigenous peoples were killed by European colonizers on the supposition that their circumstances were those of "kill or be killed." The same beliefs seem to have been important in motivating Tutsi genocides of Hutu in Burundi.

Forced mass population transfers

Forced mass population transfers occur where one (or more) national or ethnic community is physically transplanted from its homeland and compelled to live elsewhere: The contemporary Serbian expression is "ethnic cleansing," although the term has its roots in the Nazi era. A population subject to forced mass population transfers can also be forcibly "repatriated" and pushed back toward its alleged "homeland," as occurred during the high tide of apartheid in South Africa.

Forced mass population transfers must be distinguished from agreed "population exchanges," that is, the transfers that accompany agreed partitions or secessions (such as those between Greece and Turkey after the end of World War I). The population transfers in Cyprus in 1974–5 were in no sense agreed. They were the result of frightened populations moving under the threat of military coercion. Populations that move after agreed exchanges never consider such

[16] Nationalism and racism should be carefully distinguished. Nationalism recognizes the equality of nations and is not genocidal, though racism, which ranks races in a hierarchy, is dispositionally genocidal. Totalitarianism, of all brands, has encouraged fearsome politicides (e.g., of so-called kulaks), but such killings should be conceptually distinguished from genocides, even if they overlapped in practice

moves to be voluntary, but their fate must be distinguished from those unilaterally compelled to move.

Forced mass population transfers may displace rather than terminate ethnic conflict. The turmoil in what was the Soviet Union is partly an outcome of forced mass population transfers executed by Lenin and Stalin and their successors. Violence in the contemporary Caucasus is, in part, the result of similar policies pursued by both czarist and Ottoman emperors. Palestinians were expelled from Israel during the insurrectionary war that founded the state of Israel, and many Palestinians fear that the settlement of the West Bank by Israeli colonizers is merely the prelude to a further set of expulsions. In turn the creation of a Palestinian diaspora helped precipitate the destabilization of Jordan, Lebanon, and even Kuwait. Some have predicted that Bosnian Muslims face the fate of becoming the "Palestinians of Europe": dispossessed, uprooted, and stateless. In what may soon be described as the former state of Ethiopia, forced resettlement policies exacerbated the civil war and famine-proneness of the country during the mid-1980s. In the last decade the states of Nigeria, Vietnam, and Burma have expelled large numbers of residents on plainly ethnic criteria, and India has promised to expel Bengali immigrants (from Bangladesh) from the state of Assam, although this decision has not yet been implemented.

Forced mass population transfers, like genocides, are often advocated as integral components of imperial consolidation strategies. They are usually implemented after or during wars and civil wars – consider Oliver Cromwell's "transplantation" program in Ireland, czarist and Turkish policies in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, or Stalin's movement of the Volga Germans, Cossacks, and others. They may have economic dimensions: the expropriation of land and property, the removal of competitors, the denial of citizenship entitlements. Forced mass population transfers are likely to be advocated in response to the perceived threat of "ethnic swamping," as seen in the Assamese demonstrations against illegal Bengali immigration or in response to economic depressions, when the call for "repatriation" of "guest workers" may be extended to include all those who are not "sons and daughters of the soil." The call for ethnic cleansing by Serbian irregulars in Bosnia demonstrates that forced mass population transfers can be politically instrumental: to establish "facts" that might make possible territorial adjustments "impossible."[17]

[17] There is a variation on forced transfers, that is, "induced population transfers" that dilute a compact minority. In this case settlers are moved into a given territory and threaten the minority (e.g., Italians were sent to the Alto Adige under Mussolini in

There are no moral merits to forced mass population transfers, especially as they facilitate genocidal assaults on vulnerable populations and/or encourage the likelihood that the victims will suffer famine. Forced mass population transfers violate any minimalist conceptions of human rights and any egalitarian political philosophies. Nevertheless, where peoples believe that their homelands have been stolen from them by settler peoples, it becomes thinkable if not justifiable to argue that historic retribution is in order.

Partition and/or secession (self-determination)

Genocide and forced mass population transfers are obnoxious from the perspective of democratic liberalism or socialism and violate Article 27 of the United Nations' *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*: "In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."[18]

Partitioning territories to permit self-determination or secession, by contrast with genocide and mass population transfers, can, in principle, respect the rights of national and ethnic communities. Partition and secession are compatible with liberal democratic institutions (universal, periodic, and competitive elections; alternations in power; and civic freedoms of expression, assembly, and organization), in that such states can, in principle, permit secessions and preserve democratic institutions.

Partition resolves national and ethnic conflict, if it works, by divorcing communities that do not wish to live together in the same state. It can be executed in at least three different ways. Partition can be implemented by the core of the relevant state, which chooses how much of the periphery may secede: as when the United Kingdom government in effect decided how much of Ireland would be permitted to secede in 1921. Alternatively it can be carried out democratically, through consensus, that is, by allowing the relevant communities the right to exercise self-determination, to vote on whether they wish to be part of one state or another, and to draw boundaries and partition territories accordingly. The breakup of Czecho-Slovakia in 1992-3 is a

[18] In 1992 a text inspired by Article 27 was adopted in the UN, *A Draft Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, or Religious and Linguistic Minorities*.

order to break up German areas). This strategy, however, is really a subset of settler colonialism, which we primarily associate with hegemonic control (see below).

case in point. Finally, partition can be externally imposed, by outside power(s). Consider the partition of Palestine or the dismemberments of Poland in the eighteenth century and Germany in the twentieth century.

In the years between 1948 and 1991 only one new state, Bangladesh, was carved out of an existing state – *if* we exclude the very numerous cases of decolonization of European- and United States-controlled territories in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, since the collapse of the communist empires of Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union secession has become a growth-industry, the in-vogue method of ethnic conflict-resolution. Kurdistan will be next if Iraqi Kurds are allowed to have their way. The Quebecois and Eritreans are also in the queue. There are secessionist or semisecessio-nist[19] movements in Europe (e.g., among the Basque, Corsican, Northern Irish nationalist, Scottish, Slovak, and Welsh peoples), in Africa (e.g., the Polisario movement in the Moroccan-controlled west-ern Sahara, the Dinkas of the southern Sudan, and a bewildering variety of communities in the Horn of Africa); in the new republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh wishes to secede from Azerbaijan, South Ossetia from Georgia, Cri-mea from the Ukraine, and the "Dniester Republic" from Moravia); and in central and south Asia (the Khalistan movement for a Sikh homeland, the Kashmiri independence movement, Tibetans in com-munist China, and the multiple secessionists of Burma).[20]

The normative idea behind principled partitions and secessions is the idea of self-determination.[21] However, the key problem with self-determination as a means of eliminating conflict is that it begs four questions: (1) Who are the people? (2) What is the relevant territorial unit in which they should exercise self-determination? (3) What consti-tutes a majority? and (4) Does secession produce a domino effect in which minorities within seceding territories seek self-determination for themselves?

[19] We use the term semisecessionist movements to cover those seeking to leave one state to unite or reunite with another. Strict secessionists seek to create an indepen-dent state and are wrongly called irredentist. States that seek to expand to complete their nation-stateness are properly irredentist. Naturally irredentist states and semi-secessionist movements often go together. To avoid the prejudicial nature of the term irredentist perhaps we should call such states "unificationist."

[20] Although the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not legally part of the Israeli state, the Palestinian population there wants to secede from Israeli political control.

[21] Self-determination can in principle be exercised to agree to integration, assimilation, or cantonization (autonomy). However, full self-determination is understood as iso-morphic with secession.

In what were Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union these questions were not academic. Whereas there was little dispute as to "Who are the Slovenes?" and everybody knew the answer to the question "Where is Slovenia?" the same was not true of Croatia, Serbia, or Bosnia. In what was the Soviet Union it was eventually accepted that the citizens of each of the former republics had the right to self-determination, but there was no such agreement about peoples trapped in republics that they would rather not be in. Most of the former Soviet republics are in fact ethnic mine fields. There are large Russian populations (at least 20 percent of the population) in Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and Kirgizia, and a smaller but militant one in Moldavia (12.8 percent). Russia itself is fending off secessionist bids from Checheno-Ingush and Tatarstan.

There are many other hard cases in seeking to apply the doctrine of self-determination. In Transylvania there are two major populations (Hungarians and Romanians) mixed together in the same region along with other smaller communities, and the potential territorial units for plebiscites would be strongly disputed by the relevant minorities. In Northern Ireland each ethnic community claims that it is part of an-other nation and wishes the putative boundaries of that nation to be the relevant jurisdiction for decision making (O'Leary and McGarry 1993).[22] In Quebec native Canadians, who occupy a huge proportion of the province's land mass, are unwilling to secede from Canada with the Francophone majority. In the Punjab and Kashmir Hindus vehemently oppose the very idea of secession. In Slovakia the Hun-garian minority fears that the secession of the Slovaks from Czecho-slovakia will be detrimental to their interests.

A majority for secession begs the question of a majority in what region? In moderately complex cases the principle of self-determination seems indeterminate. As Ivor Jennings remarked: "On the surface [the principle of self-determination] seem[s] reasonable: let the people decide. It [i]s in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people" (1956, 56). Exer-cising self-determination is only straightforward where there is no large or disgruntled minority within the relevant region affected by the proposed secession *and* when the seceding area includes the great majority of those who wish to leave.

There have been some ingenious proposals for a normative liberal theory of secession that can answer Jennings's question about who

[22] However, Northern Ireland unionists are ambiguous about whether they believe the boundaries of the UK or of Northern Ireland should be the ultimate jurisdiction for constitutional decision making.

decides who are the people (e.g., Beran 1984; 1987). Beran advances the argument that every (self-defined) area within a liberal democratic state should be given the right to secede, provided the same right is extended to every subarea within the proposed secessionist territory. This argument answers the serious accusation that self-determination creates a dangerous domino effect by saying two different things: There is nothing wrong with allowing a state to fragment on the principle of self-determination; and (b) the fact that the seceding units themselves should grant the right of secession within their boundaries should put a prudential check on the aspiration to seek secession in territorially problematic zones.

Unfortunately it is difficult to think of instances where the optimal conditions for self-determination leading to full independence have applied. Norway's secession from Sweden was an exemplary case. So was the case of Swiss Jura, which illustrates that Beran's conditions can be fulfilled (although it is an example from a substate region). Here, in an "internal secession" plebiscites were held commune by commune to produce a result that split the new canton into two, along religious rather than ethnic lines (Protestants voted to stay with Bern canton).

Usually, however, partitions are very messy. The partitions of Ireland and India left significant minorities behind in Northern Ireland and Kashmir. And those who celebrated the exercise of self-determination in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have tempered their enthusiasm in the light of the time bombs left in the debris. Even when secessions seem straightforward and the seceding areas appear reasonably homogeneous, new conflicts can emerge fairly rapidly. The Ukraine is a possible future example. Most commentators have focused on the dangers posed by the sizeable Russian minority, but less attention has been paid to the deep historical, cultural, and geographical divisions between Catholic westerners (who were annexed by Stalin) and the Orthodox (who have been linked to Russia for some three centuries). After the glow of national liberation fades, so might Ukrainian national unity.

A fundamental problem with partition is that many communities identify a national territory as sacred and indivisible. Until 1988 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) refused to consider the partition of Palestine (calling the idea "filastinian"). The Likud and other right-wing parties in Israel refuse to consider the partition of "Eretz Israel." The very idea of the partition of Ireland, rather than the particular partition imposed in 1920, continues to outrage Irish nationalists. The African National Congress (ANC) is wedded to the concept

of a united South Africa and refuses to consider white or Inkatha proposals for partition.

Some argue that the right of secession should be built into the South African constitution to reduce the fears of the Zulu-based Inkatha and white extremists that a democratic South Africa will become a vehicle of ANC/non-Zulu hegemony, believing that the inclusion of a secession clause in the new constitution will create incentives to accommodate ethnic minorities (for a contrary argument see Buchanan 1991, 159–61). However, the right of secession seems unlikely to be entrenched in many modern liberal democratic constitutions, although the Canadians may pioneer the implementation of the principle,[23] and secession is likely to continue to have a bad press among liberals and socialists.[24] Yet, with the collapse of the global Cold War, there is now much greater room for successful secession and the alteration of borders artificially frozen by the strategic interests of the superpowers – as the reunification of Germany suggests. The Cold War had elevated the stability of boundaries into a necessity. Rather than face nuclear confrontation each superpower respected the boundaries of the other's client-states, at least in Europe. "Globalization" and the increasing power of suprastate organizations may also make some international boundaries less inviolate.

However, secession remains an option very likely to produce violence.

[23] The one liberal democracy to have granted the right of secession is the United Kingdom. In 1949 it granted the right of secession to the Northern Ireland parliament, and in 1985 it granted the right of the people of Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland. However, this right, Irish nationalist critics point out, was not one that the local majority of unionists were likely to choose.

The right of secession was fictionally embodied in successive Soviet constitutions, even though the Bolsheviks had ruthlessly reconquered the territories of the Czarist Russian empire. It will now be more difficult for western political elites who recognized the breakaway republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to deny the right of secession to their own communities. Thus the Canadian government, pandering to its large Ukrainian minority, was the first western state to recognize the Ukraine after its December 1991 referendum. Refusal to recognize Quebec's right to self-determination would be glaring hypocrisy.

[24] It is a nice irony that liberals and socialists favour lax divorce laws rather than indissoluble marriage, whereas their arguments against secession have a remarkable isomorphism with the arguments deployed against the legalization of divorce. Thus the dangers posed to children by divorce are analogous to the dangers posed to minorities; the reduced incentives to work out differences between marriage partners are analogous to the reduced incentives to establish a workable accommodation between communities; and the likelihood that one partner will benefit more than another from divorce is analogous to the argument that the better-off group should not be allowed to secede in order to obtain material advantages.

lence and problems (initially) as bad as the ones it is intended to solve. Partitions can lead to population movements, often involuntary ones, and mobile populations are highly vulnerable to massacre, as happened during and after the partition of the Indian subcontinent (Khoshla 1950). Who does the partitioning matters, and the principles under which they carry it out may determine the future pattern of conflict. Consider the British-managed partitions in Ireland, India, and Palestine (Fraser 1984); but, conversely, consider where the British decided not to partition: Sri Lanka and Cyprus.

Whether implementing secession is straightforward, along Beran's lines or not, the proposal of any community to secede from any state is likely to encourage key "unionist" elites in the affected states to behave in chauvinistic and warlike ways: The peaceful secessions of Iceland from Denmark or Norway from Sweden were exceptional in modern history.[25] The secessions from the Soviet Union have been surprisingly less violent than those from Yugoslavia. Normally, however, secessionist movements provoke unionist movements against traitors.

What can be said about the circumstances under which secession/partitions are likely to be carried out? Three external phenomena matter most and need to be studied closely: (1) the nature of the interstate (international) system (is it permissive or restrictive?); (2) the aftermath of wars (which often lead to territorial transfers/partitions, often without any considerations of consent); and (3) the disintegration of empires (although this observation is almost tautological).

What, if anything, can be said about the economics of self-determination? People seek full self-determination, in the form of independent statehood, for a variety of reasons, of which strictly economic ones are but a subset, and which sometimes supersede narrowly economic "rationality." The urge for self-government may be motivated by a reaction against ethnic discrimination and humiliation, by the pragmatic expectation that the new nation-state will have greater political freedom, by the wish to have a state in which different public policies will be pursued, by the desire for power and prestige among nationalist elites, or to protect an ethnic culture from extinction.

Not much of a very general nature can be successfully sustained about the economic circumstances or motivations of full-scale ethnic secessionist movements (Connor 1973; 1984). One lucid observer

[25] It was ironic to watch U.S. commentators warning the Soviet Union during 1990-1 to allow its republics the right to self-determination. As Gorbachev observed, the heirs of Lincoln have short memories.

notes that secessions are demanded both by economically advanced groups (e.g., Basques, Catalans, Ibos, Lombards, Sikhs, Tamils) and by economically backward communities (East Bengalis, Karens, Kurds, Slovaks) and that secessionist communities can be located in either backward or advanced regional economies (Horowitz 1985, 229ff). Although the (absolute and relative) economic circumstances of communities matter there are good arguments for rejecting "direct causal relationships between regional economic disparity and ethnic secession" (p. 235). One tentative generalization Horowitz offers is that backward communities in backward regions are the most likely to secede be early secessionists, whereas advanced communities have to suffer considerably before their cost–benefit calculus shifts in favor of secessionism. Yet even this thesis needs to be revised in the light of the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia – in which the economically advanced nations of the west and north, respectively, were in the vanguard of secession.[26]

Enthusiasm for self-determination flows primarily from the democratization of the world. Democratization means that the people are to rule, however indirectly. But the question is: Who are the people? The ethnic nationalist declares they are the nation, whereas the civic nationalist declares they are all those who are resident in a given state or political unit's boundaries. In a few happy cases – Iceland – these two answers approximately coincide. However, in most cases they do not. In the general case the definition and championing of the people are up for grabs. The possibility of partition/secession threatens any state where ethnic and civic nationalisms point to different definitions of the nation.

Democratization poses a clustered and linked set of issues: the most important being the definition of citizenship, the possession of the franchise, the state's boundaries, and the organizational structure of the state. These issues facilitate political entrepreneurs who seek to build parties on national or ethnic cleavages, whether at the foundation of the state or afterwards. Politicians in multinational and multiethnic states have multiple incentives to play national or ethnic cards: whether it be Churchill playing the Orange card in the United Kingdom in the 1880s, Le Pen playing the Algerian card in France in the 1980s, or Advani fanning Hindu chauvinism in India in the early 1990s.

[26] Economic explanations may have more potency in accounting for decisions by imperial elites to accept the dismemberment of their empires. When the costs of empire or redistribution outweigh geopolitical benefits, secession on the periphery may be countenanced.

It seems impossible to immunize the democratic process to exclude potentially explosive civic and ethnic issues – although constitutional protections can, in principle, be established. They are always there for mobilization by the oppressed or the opportunist or both. Those who lose out politically under existing state arrangements and policies, whoever they may be, may always choose to redefine the rules of the game by playing the national or ethnic card in the arena of party politics.

If there are any economic differences between communities in a liberal democratic state,[27] these reinforcing cleavages are more likely to result in the formation of ethnic parties. Where political parties are representative of all ethnic communities, party competition raises no immediate threat of destabilization. However, this case is unusual. Contemporary India is the more predictable outcome of the mobilization of both ethnic and economic inequalities into the party system. Now the dominant Congress party is primarily mobilized around the dominant community, in competition with a more extreme chauvinist party of the same community, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), while facing an array of opposition parties that are either autonomist or secessionist.

The reason national and ethnic questions are potentially explosive and raise the possibility that some people(s) will be tempted to exercise self-determination through secession is simple. National and ethnic questions raise relatively nontradable issues. Nationality, language, territorial homelands, and culture are not easily bargained over. They are not easily divisible public goods in the language of economists. They create zero-sum conflicts and provide ideal materials for political entrepreneurs interested in creating or dividing political constituencies.

Having suggested why democratization increases the likelihood that communities will seek self-determination and thereby destabilize multiethnic and multinational states, we must make two qualifications. First, destabilization is likely to be contained if the relevant state exists in a milieu of liberal democratic states. Thus far in the twentieth century, liberal democracies have never gone to war against one another. Whether the avoidance of wars is a systemic feature of liberal democratic interstate relations is not something upon which we wish to pronounce, although there may be some grounds for "thinkful wish-

[27] There will almost inevitably be such differences, whether or not they flow from discrimination, historic advantages/disadvantages, or differing cultural traits or preferences that give some groups an advantage in the relevant division of labor

ing." Second, there are circumstances under which the destabilizing effects of democratization upon multiethnic states can be muted and inhibit the impetus to consider secession. These factors include: internal territorial segregation that permits self-government ("good fences make good neighbors"); demographic dominance (where the largest community is sufficiently secure not to fear the minority [or minorities] and behaves in a generous way); demographic stability (where one or more communities are not outgrowing or "outfailing" one another); and a history of predemocratic cooperation among ethnic political elites that gives the postauthoritarian state a reasonable chance of promoting accommodation.

Integration and/or assimilation

A fourth method of macropolitical-conflict regulation is built upon the idea of trying to eliminate differences by seeking to integrate or assimilate the relevant communities into a new transcendent identity. Integration and assimilation can be considered as end points of a continuum. Whereas civic integration has the more modest object of creating a common civic, national, or patriotic identity,[28] assimilation aims to create a common cultural identity through the merging of differences (the melting pot). Proponents of integration or assimilation can find implicit support in John Stuart Mill's declaration that "free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow feeling . . . the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist" (Mill 1988, 392).

Integration has been the official aspiration of civil rights leaders in the United States, the ANC in South Africa, unionist "integrationists" and the integrated education lobby in Northern Ireland, and the democratic left and right in those European countries striving to cope with the Fourth World: the new immigrant communities of western Europe.[29] Though inconceivable a few years ago integration has been embraced by pragmatists in South Africa's National party who believe that capitalism can be secured and improved under liberal integration better than under apartheid.

Advocates of integration policies usually favor reducing the differences between communities, ensuring that the children of the (poten-

[28] Horowitz (1985, 567) calls civic integration "inter-ethnic nationalism."

[29] The term "fourth world" is also claimed by the movements aiming to unite all the aboriginal peoples of the world.

tially rival) communities go to the same schools, socializing them in the same language and conventions, encouraging public and private housing policies that prevent segregation, and ensuring that the workplace is integrated through outlawing discrimination. Liberal integrationists promote bills of rights with equal rights for individuals (rather than communities).

Assimilationists go further. They favor merging ethnic identities, either into one already established (e.g., a Soviet or Yugoslav identity). The ultimate proof of successful assimilation is large-scale intermarriage across the former ethnic boundaries that leads first to their blurring and then to their eradication.

Integrationists and assimilationists, whatever their differences, support "catchall" political parties, argue against ethnic political parties, and aim to shun all policies that might show up differences between communities.[10]

Integration/assimilation strategies are very characteristic of two types of states: those engaged in nation building, that is, states that are seeking to forge a common national identity when they know that such an identity does not exist or is at best precarious; and those that have very numerically small minorities.

Integration and assimilation are driven by both high-minded and instrumental motives. Liberals and socialists, with the best of intentions, associate ethnic pluralism with sectarianism, parochialism, narrow-mindedness, and chauvinist bigotry. They maintain that those opposed to integration either want or risk societal disintegration. Canadian integrationists demanded a Charter of Rights after 1945 to prevent a repeat of the war-time internment of ethnic minorities (Japanese, Italians, and Ukrainians). White liberals in the United States funded court cases promoting black integration. Other liberals in North America sincerely advocate the assimilation of aboriginal minorities as the best way to end atrocious conditions on reservations (e.g., Gibson 1992). Likewise the European left and center generally espouses the integration of immigrants because it abhors racism and discrimination. Economic instrumentalism may also suggest integration or assimilation: A linguistically and culturally homogenized national community is functional for industrial civilization (Gellner 1983).

However, sometimes integrationism is not so high-minded or liberal

[10] Integrationists/assimilationists are especially skeptical about consociational arrangements that they believe entrench ethnic divisions and reward divisive political leaders.

in its instrumentalism. Integration or assimilation may mask the imposition of a core or dominant culture. In Northern Ireland those who advocate integration of all as either British or Irish citizens are often scoring ethnic points; whereas in South Africa some of those who advocate integration are either interested in preserving their economic privileges (whites) or see it as a way of establishing majority control (blacks). Sometimes integrationism is not even accompanied by formal generosity – consider white Canadians or white Britons who rail against Sikhs being allowed to wear their turbans where others would not be permitted to do so.

Integration/assimilationist projects may also aim at uniting (moderately) different communities against a common foe. The Anglican ascendancy in early modern Ireland promoted pan-Protestant unity against an insurgent native/Catholic threat. The South African government ensured that all whites (English, Greeks, Italians, European Jews) and not just Afrikaners benefited from apartheid to create pan-white unity against blacks. Israeli governments downplay Sephardic–Askenazi differences in the interest of presenting a united front against Palestinians. During the nineteenth century the dominant English minority in Quebec welcomed Irish and other English-speaking immigrants as allies against French Canadians, and contemporary Quebecois, troubled by the low birth rate among Francophones, have recently turned to nonwhite but French-speaking immigrants (from Haiti, Senegal, and former French colonies) to bolster their linguistic community.

The targets of integration/assimilation policies respond in various ways – partly as a function of their perceptions of the motives lying behind the policies. Integration/assimilation policies are often targeted at migrants in liberal democratic states. These policies are more overtly liberal than the form of quasi-control associated with *metic*, or guest-worker, policies. In Canada immigrant communities have acquired a Canadian civic identity on top of their original ethnic identity. The United States has proved a melting pot in which some ethnic assimilation has taken place,[11] although it would be better to say that white Protestants have assimilated (Swedes, Norwegians, and Germans) and that white Catholics (Irish, Italians, and Poles) have gradually assimilated.[12] After 1945 both Canada and the United States

[11] American assimilationism is built on the concept of the "melting pot," whereas Canadian assimilationism is based on the idea of "the cultural mosaic." In theory the latter is more tolerant of multiculturalism under a common civic identity.

[12] It was not until 1960 that the Americans elected their first Irish Catholic president. They have never elected a Pole or an Italian.

have had some success in integrating Asian immigrants. Similarly, "New Australians" have emerged in the wake of postwar continental European migrations. These cases of moderately successful integration/assimilation involved migrations to a "new" country, where the migrants, in principle, were willing to adapt their cultures to their new host country and accept a new civic identity.

However, where national or ethnic communities insist on autonomy or self-government, or where no external threat can compel pancommunity unity, integration/assimilation policies fall on stonier ground. Integrations/assimilations occurring within and across historic homelands, as opposed to new societies, are much more difficult to find in modern history.[33] Communities living in their putative ancestral territories are less willing than individual migrants to shed their culture or accept some new overarching identity. In the United States and Canada, Native Americans resist assimilation and hold out for varying degrees of self-government (or what we call cantonization below). They call themselves "first nations" to stress the moral superiority of their claims to cultural protection.[34]

Assimilation on contested homeland, however high-minded, cannot work consensually where it involves assimilation on one community's terms: If one community's language, culture, religion, and national myths are given precedence then we are not talking of assimilation or integration but of annexation, in such cases people complain of *ethnocide*, the destruction of a people's culture as opposed to physical liquidation of its members. This complaint is the standard one raised by the indigenous peoples of the world.

Some forms of integration and assimilation appear to require coercion. Compulsory educational homogenization and the imposition of standard cultural codes are preconditions of full industrial and welfare-state citizenship. Making peasants into French people in the nineteenth century, the schooling of black South Africans in Afrikaans, the Russification practiced by the czars and the CPSU, the periodic attempts at Anglicization of French Canada in the eighteenth and

[33] The integration of immigrants in "new states" – in the Americas and elsewhere – often took place after the genocide or expulsion of indigenous peoples.
[34] There are, however, some examples of assimilation within and across historic homelands. Substantial numbers of Slavs were assimilated as Germans and Austrians (see Vienna's telephone directory). Likewise Germans and Slavs were assimilated by Hungarians; Ukrainians and Germans were assimilated by Poles, and some Poles were assimilated by Russians. Where urbanization is occurring, and the assimilating group is relatively open and prestigious, the assimilands may not care to preserve their ethnic identity.

nineteenth centuries, and the Romanization implemented by Ceausescu in Transylvania are policies cut from the same cloth: In the extreme, ethnocidal assimilation looks indistinguishable from milder forms of genocide. But even arguably more neutral strategies of integration/assimilation have encountered significant resistance, as with Nehruvian secularism in India or Yugoslav and Soviet communism. These efforts to establish transcendent or panethnic identities were seen by minorities as disguised forms of cultural annexation, although the same policies were often rejected by the relevant dominant communities who saw the new identities as detrimental to their Hindu, Serbian, or Russian cultures.

Those who regard assimilation/integration strategies as benign forms of ethnic-conflict regulation in contested homelands are sometimes naive. Optimistic observers of South Africa need to be counseled that it will be some time before representative Afrikaners and blacks embrace the ANC and the National party, respectively. The Hutu in Burundi are not likely to abandon their distinct identity or their ethnic organizations just because such actions would fit the agenda of the Tutsi-dominated government. In the foreseeable future Northern Ireland Catholics, Basques, and Croats are unlikely to be integrated or assimilated with their ethnic enemies. In fact resistance to unwanted assimilation or integration projects is likely to be very high and can provoke ethnic revivals and secessionism in response, as has occurred in Burma, Ghana, Iraq, Sudan, and Uganda (Horowitz 1985, 567–8).

Modern minority ethnic identities can only be significantly sustained through educational and neighborhood segregation of some kind, because these conditions are necessary to preserve a cultural critical mass in the relevant communities. Some go further and claim that such communities require broadcasting media and control over access to landed property to sustain their identities. Such arguments explain why policies designed to compel people to be schooled together and to be neighbors or indeed simply to promote the rules of free-market capitalism are provocative and possibly productive of violence.

In short, unless assimilation/integration projects are targeted at people willing to acquire a new civic identity (like voluntary migrants) and to modify their national or ethnic identity, they produce rather than provoke conflict (Nordlinger 1972, 36–9).

For these reasons, among others, many liberal democracies that are managing large-scale immigrations or multiple recently established ethnic communities, have realized that multicultural policies may

make greater sense than straightforward integration or assimilation strategies. They are abandoning the spirit of classical liberalism to manage the Fourth world. In England and France, at least in previous generations, liberals had a general bias toward integration/assimilation as macropolitical forms of ethnic-conflict resolution – at least within the metropolitan cores of their empires. This strategy sought to resolve ethnic conflict by eliminating ethnic differences. But often the relevant problem is the desire of members of ethnic communities to maintain differences that liberals committed to the right of individuals to choose their own conceptions of the good find it hard to argue against. This difficulty leads to a normative division of opinion between liberal integrationists (who are accused of intolerance) and liberal multiculturalists (who are accused of surrendering liberalism to a cultural relativism that tolerates illiberalism, e.g., in the form of Muslim schools).[15]

Political engineers seeking to resolve national or ethnic conflict frequently recommend the development of catchall political parties to break down ethnic cleavages, that is, they advocate electoral integration/assimilation. For example, the absence of British political parties in Northern Ireland before 1989 led one enthusiast to argue that the British party boycott was "the fundamental reason" for continuing conflict in the region (Roberts 1991, 132). Those persuaded of the merits of engineering electoral integration include the military framers of Nigeria's second constitution, which forced political parties nominating presidential candidates to develop some support in all regions of the state.

Such electoral integrationist projects may be well-intentioned ways of regulating ethnic conflict, but they are mostly based on wishful thinking. If there are parties that already mobilize across ethnic divisions then political stability is likely to be greater, and that is all to the good; but the belief that one can generate parties with such effects through heroic acts of will or engineering is fundamentally utopian, especially if the relevant ethnic communities have already been mobilized behind different conceptions of nationalism.[16] As one astute observer generalizes:

15 Liberal multiculturalists have abandoned integrationism in favor of macropolitical ways of managing differences rather than eliminating them (e.g., Kymlicka, 1991, and see below).

16 When one of us had more hair he held such foolishly optimistic beliefs about Northern Ireland (O'Leary 1987). Reading of failed panaceas elsewhere is a salutary experience for those inclined to offer political prescriptions based on a narrow range of political experience.

It is sometimes possible to maintain a system of party alignments cutting across a line of communal cleavage. It is usually possible to shift from this to a system where parties articulate the communal cleavage. But it is extremely difficult if not impossible to move in the reverse direction, because of the primitive psychological strength of communal identification and the effects of social reinforcement on maintaining the political salience of communal identification. (Barry 1991b, 146)[17]

In addition to the agreed and coercive forms of integration/assimilation discussed above there are cases where the dominated community has sought assimilation/integration, but has been denied it by the dominant community. America's melting pot has not successfully extended (if it was ever so intended) to blacks or Afro-Americans, whose ancestors were not voluntary immigrants to the United States. Until the 1950s the local white majorities in the Deep South worked a system of control and sought to prevent any kind of integration, let alone assimilation. While blacks, with some exceptions,[18] support integration and won formal victories to establish this goal in public policy in the 1950s and the 1960s, American cities and schools remain segregated and racial life chances are still dramatically unequal.[19] In Northern Ireland the unionist government and party blocked the integrationist ambitions of at least some Catholics in the 1960s, precipitating the current long wave of political violence. If, as one academic anticipates, the Palestinians switch their demands from separate nationhood to demanding civil rights within the Israeli state, we might expect a similar pattern (Nusseibeh 1990).

Although some liberal and bourgeois elites within dominant communities might favor integration/assimilation of the dominated, as a way of broadening the legitimacy of their regimes, they often find that such

17 Barry (1991a) cites the case of Sri Lanka as an illustration. After Sinhalese politicians exploited antagonisms toward Tamils in the 1956 elections, they found that the potent communal tensions they had provoked could not be reversed (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 135–6).

18 Some blacks (e.g., Malcolm X and Louis Farakhan) have rejected the American way, preaching separatism, black consciousness, self-reliance, and, on occasions, secession.

19 The undeclared goal of American public policy in major conurbations appears to be that of controlling rather than integrating blacks. The Reagan and Bush administrations have effectively quarantined blacks and controlled them through increased spending on police and prisons: leading to more young blacks being in prison than in higher education by the end of the 1980s. Although control works reasonably well, from the perspective of whites, it can lead to sudden breakdowns – as in Los Angeles in April 1992

ambitions provoke a furious backlash from their coethnics in less privileged positions. In Northern Ireland in the late 1960s moderate integrationist Protestant unionists lost all influence over their "followers." The current South African government is gambling that it can integrate blacks into a new political system before it has to face the white electorate again: If it fails it will go the way of all flesh.

Methods for managing differences

Hegemonic control

The most common system of managing as opposed to eliminating ethnic conflict practiced in multi- or biethnic states is that of "hegemonic control," a concept first developed by Ian Lustick (1979, 1987), although we use the term slightly differently (O'Leary and Arthur 1991; O'Leary and McGarry 1993, chs. 3, 4). Hegemonic control has been the most common mode through which multiethnic societies have been stabilized in world history. Imperial or authoritarian regimes controlled multiple cultures within their territories through coercive domination and elite co-option.[40] They suppressed latent divisions between ethnic communities that might otherwise have been manifested, especially in conditions of modernization. The control was "hegemonic" if it made an overtly violent ethnic contest for state power either "unthinkable" or "unworkable" on the part of the subordinated communities: Ethnically based slave systems were exemplary cases of authoritarian hegemonic control, so also were colonial settler systems that made native revolts unworkable. Hegemonic control in imperial or authoritarian regimes need not have rested, although it often did, on the support of the largest or most powerful ethnic community.[41] What was necessary was control of the relevant coercive apparatuses: Thus minorities in Burundi, Fiji (after 1987), Liberia (before 1980), and South Africa (until 1990–1) were able to sustain hegemonic control because of their sovereignty over security and policing systems.

Hegemonic control is therefore coercive and/or co-optive rule that

40 Co-opting elites as a technique for monopolizing power should be distinguished from offering to share power. The former is characteristic of control, the latter of consociationalism. Some leaders of the ANC believe that the South African government is offering them the former under the guise of offering them the latter.

41 The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were good examples of modern authoritarian regimes in which ethnic contests for state power were made "unworkable" under communist hegemony. In several respects they were indistinguishable from empires.

successfully manages to make unworkable an ethnic challenge to the state order. In authoritarian empires there was usually no grand objective pursued to eliminate ethnic difference, although one might argue that the world religions were propagated to confer transcendent identities. By contrast, in communist hegemonic systems, a new transcendent identity was consistently proclaimed: one which would eventually eliminate ethnic differences as irrelevant to people's civic identities as citizens. However, after initial postrevolutionary fervor it was rare for this vision to be articulated as one that would utterly eradicate ethnic difference, and the policies of Communist parties primarily focused on suppressing the politicization of ethnic differences.

In liberal democracies, or "open regimes" (to use Nordlinger's expression [1972]), hegemonic control appears infeasible. Liberal democracies permit, indeed facilitate, ethnic organization and mobilization; and ethnic contests for state power become eminently thinkable and workable within liberal democratic or open institutions. Think of how Irish nationalism was facilitated by the democratization of the United Kingdom or of how nationalism was encouraged by *glasnost* in the Soviet Union. Similarly, the breakdown of the Franco regime in Spain after 1975 facilitated challenges to the Spanish state. The liberal optimist might conclude that democratization spells doom to systems of hegemonic control.

However, systems of hegemonic control, or ethnic domination, can be constructed in liberal democratic states. The most obvious method is when liberal democratic institutions are monopolized by a minority of the state's population. Thus white South Africans and Rhodesians established settler control over other ethnic communities, while governing themselves through liberal democratic rules. Citizenship and representative government were confined to the *Herrenvolk*. Minority control within a given region is very common: Consider Serbia's ruthless domination of Albanians in Kosovo after 1987 or the treatment of the majority Bengalis in what was East Pakistan. In Fiji the native minority, frightened by electoral returns that threatened their participation in government, supported a coup in 1987 that led to minority hegemonic control. They hope, however, that demographic trends and increased Indian emigration will reconvert natives into a majority.[42]

42 Unlike Northern Ireland, Rhodesia, and South Africa, all of which are, or have been, forms of settler control, Fiji and Malaysia are – or are becoming – forms of native control. Native hegemonic control over settlers may also be experimented with in the former Soviet Union – if the Latvian proposal to exclude Russian immigrants from former Soviet Union sets a trend.

But hegemonic control can occur in states in which the majority or entirely of the relevant state's adult population have formal access to citizenship. Democracy in its most primitive meaning is understood as "majority rule." "Where political "majorities" constantly fluctuate, as people change their minds on the key policy or political issues of the day, then majority rule is a sensible decision rule, infinitely preferable to the kind of minority rule practiced by emperors, military dictators, or one-party regimes. However, where there are two or more deeply established national or ethnic communities and where the members of these communities do not agree on the basic institutions and policies the regime should pursue, or where the relevant communities are not internally fragmented on key policy preferences in ways that crosscut each other, then majority rule can become an instrument of hegemonic control.

When simple majoritarianism is implemented in multiethnic or bi-communal societies it usually either leads to hegemonic control (e.g., postindependence Sri Lanka) or, over the longer run, promotes state fragmentation through the development of civil war and secessionist movements (e.g., contemporary Sri Lanka). Many of the postcolonial states of Africa and south Asia, after the British abandoned their imperial commitments, were built on the Westminster model of liberal democracy. They soon became vehicles for ethnic domination and, with the notable exception of India, almost invariably became straightforward dictatorships. Northern Ireland (1920–72), and the Deep South of the United States (c. 1870–c. 1964), are examples of regions in liberal democratic states where formal majoritarianism coexisted with hegemonic control over the relevant minority. The relevant majority monopolized the police and judicial systems, manipulated the franchise to consolidate their domination, practiced economic discrimination in employment and the allocation of public housing and institutional discrimination against the minority's cultural and educational system(s), and ruthlessly repressed minority discontent. The Canadian state practiced control over aboriginal peoples: Natives were policed through the white judicial system, denied certain privileges if they left reservations, and denied the (federal) franchise if they remained on them (until 1961). In India, the demands of Sikhs for an autonomous Punjab partly arose from their fear that Nehruvian tolerance had increasingly given way to Hindu chauvinism, presaging a move toward control as the preferred Hindu method of governing India.

The normative lesson is obvious: A majoritarian system of liberal democratic government, designed to create strong powers for the governing party, is no guarantee of liberty for minorities. A "winner

takes all" system in the presence of ethnic parties ensures that ethnic competition will be regarded as a zero-sum conflict. Where two or more communities wish to belong to different external nation-states the potential instability of majoritarian liberal democracy is even more obvious, and the temptations to establish a system of control by the majority are correspondingly greater (consider Northern Ireland unionists' treatment of Irish nationalists after 1920). However, majoritarianism on the Westminster (or Paris) model is not the only form of tarianism on the Westminster (or Paris) model is not the only form of democratic institution poorly designed for conflict regulation, merely the worst.[41]

Some maintain that systems of hegemonic control can be normatively defensible. Lustick (1979) argues that control is often the only alternative to continuous war – he had in mind Lebanon after 1976. However, this quasi-Hobbesian reasoning (any state is better than none) is suspect. Consider the consequences of universalizing Lustick's argument. It would lead one to maintain, as some now do, that the dictatorial Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Yugoslav League of Communists were morally justified precisely because they suppressed national and ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,[44] that one-party states in Africa and Asia are similarly defensible, and that the reimposition of Ba'thist control over the Kurds is preferable to continuous civil war in Iraq.

There are further difficulties. The options in any given national or ethnic conflict are rarely simply between those of control and continuous war – although there will always be plenty of politicians and paramilitaries seeking to advance precisely this argument. Some of the alternative options to control (federalism/cantonization, arbitration, and consociationalism) have some record of success in stabilizing democracy in deeply divided societies, whereas any system of control is easily convertible into a system for the execution of genocide, ethnocide, forced mass population transfers, and other violations of human rights. Partitionist or secessionist options are almost invariably more desirable than the imposition of control. If the relevant partition

[43] O'Leary was interviewed by a Serbian television crew in 1988 about the merits of the British system of government. The interviewer, an admirer of Slobodan Milosevic, brought the interview to a halt when O'Leary said the introduction of plurality rule (the British voting system) into Yugoslavia would be disastrous.

The present Serb and Croat leaderships (Milosevic in Serbia and Tudjman in Croatia) were elected under plurality rule and their parties are dramatically over-represented in their respective legislatures.

[44] Wiseacres will soon speak of the "golden age of Brezhnev" or the "halcyon days of Tito."

or secession is even moderately well executed it should ensure that more people can enjoy legitimate self-government than would otherwise be the case. Also, under systems of control the subordinated minority will always seek to "internationalize" their plight under the relevant hegemonic group or party/dictator and thereby threaten the stability of the relevant regime as well as the international order. Therefore one can use stability arguments that are the converse of Lustick's.[45] Finally, if a system of control eventually breaks down, its practices will simply have added to the accumulated stock of grievances. Continual repression sidelines moderates, bolsters extremists, and obstructs prospects for future accommodation: Consider the Punjab, Northern Ireland, and the West Bank and Gaza strip.

Arbitration (third-party intervention)

Arbitration of biethnic or multiethnic states is the least recognized mode of conflict regulation, except perhaps in the literature of international relations and peace studies (Hoffman 1992). The main classification problems with arbitration are deciding whether or not it includes: both internal and external arbitration; what one of this book's authors has elsewhere called "co-operative internationalization" (O'Leary 1989); and forceful intervention by a self-appointed umpire concerned with establishing stability in a given region. These classification problems share one feature. One must decide whether to classify any conflict-regulating activity that is the outcome of third-party intervention as arbitration or to confine arbitration to cases where the third-party intervention is characterized by procedural neutrality of some kind. Our preference is for the latter, more exclusive usage[46] – especially because many third-party interventions are indistinguishable from efforts to establish control of a given region.

Arbitration, on our construal, entails the intervention of a neutral, bipartisan or multipartisan authority. It differs from other methods used to stabilize antagonistic societies because it involves conflict regulation by agents other than the contending parties. Integral to the

45 One might even argue in a realist fashion, although the evidence would need careful appraisal, that wars may sort matters out more successfully than exercising hegemonic control and create incentives for postwar cooperative behavior (as some believe to be true of Nigeria).

46 In legal literature adjudication is the term usually used to refer to neutral third-party intervention (coupled with an imposed decision), whereas arbitration can often involve nonneutral third parties (e.g. commercial arbitrations) pushing the parties toward compromise (my thanks to David Schiff).

concept of arbitration is that the disinterestedness of the arbiter makes it possible for this person (or institution or state) to win the acquiescence, if not the enthusiastic support, of the contending ethnic segments; and thereby dampen the violence that would otherwise occur. An arbiter provides governmental effectiveness where war or anarchy might otherwise prevail. Arbitration is distinguishable from *mediation* because the arbiter makes the relevant decisions, whereas mediators merely facilitate them. Thus from 1991 the European Community has primarily been mediating rather than arbitrating in what was "Yugoslavia."

The role of the arbiter is portrayed like that of a conciliator presiding over a family quarrel. The arbiter pursues the common interests of the rival segments in the relevant society as she/he perceives them; regulates the political exchanges between the segments as an umpire (to prevent a further and more dramatic breakdown in state order); and presides over elites who have varying incentives to engage in responsible and cooperative behavior.

Arbitration, in principle, can establish the conditions for longer-term conflict resolution: secessions, partitions, power sharing, or even the peaceful integration or assimilation of the rival communities. But third-party interventionists can play the role of self-appointed arbiters and act to reconstruct the old system of ethnic control – as for example occurred when a Russian czar handed back Hungary to Hapsburg control in 1849 or when the British empire handed Northern Ireland to the Ulster Unionist party in 1920–1. Alternatively self-appointed arbiters can presage the creation of a new system of control by handing power to a different ethnic segment, as some maintain Syria will eventually do in the Lebanon.

The prerequisite for agreed arbitration is that the arbiter's claim to neutrality be broadly accepted by the major contending ethnic segments.[47] Not all professed arbiters pass this test. Since "neutrality" is rhetorically superior to "partisanship" and useful for domestic and international consumption, the self-presentations of arbiters must be treated with scepticism: Few observers credited Syria's intervention in Lebanon or Soviet federal intervention in Nagorno Karabakh with impartiality, and the disinterestedness of U.S. arbitration in the Middle East is widely questioned. Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland

47 Within any ethnic community there are likely to be activists who will challenge the neutrality of any arbiter, and there will always be those who are so co-opted that they will proclaim the benign impartiality of even the most blatantly partisan interventionist. Observers and reporters of ethnic conflicts have to ensure that spokespersons of ethnic communities are representative.

did not regard the British government as a neutral arbiter after 1972 (O'Leary and McGarry 1993, ch. 5); and the British government appeared to acknowledge this fact when it signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, providing a role for the Irish government as guardian of the Irish nationalist minority (ch. 6).

Arbitration of ethnic conflicts is of two broad types, the internal and the external, each of which can be performed by different kinds of agents. *Internal arbitration* can be executed by an individual who is not a member of the main antagonistic communities: for example Julius Nyerere in postindependence Tanzania. It can be fulfilled by statesmen with the moral authority to transcend their ethnic origins: for example Mahatma Gandhi in the Indian subcontinent or President Tito in Yugoslavia. It can also be managed by someone who can claim a connection with all the major ethnic groups: for example Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone. Internal arbitration can also be performed by institutions. The monarchy in pre-1965 Burundi arbitrated between Tutsi and Hutu. The U.S. Supreme Court, under the leadership of Justice Warren, arbitrated conflicts between blacks and whites in the 1950s and 1960s. Federal governments, like supreme courts, can arbitrate ethnic conflict within the constituent units of their federation, as occurs regularly in Canada, where the Ottawa government has constitutional responsibility for indigenous minorities in the provinces. Although few U.S. blacks or Canadian natives regarded the federal government as their institutions, they clearly thought them more impartial than state or provincial governments.[48] Finally, internal arbitration can be performed by a political party. One-party states claim to absorb key members of rival ethnic communities and to regulate their rival aspirations. This argument was advanced by Nkrumah in Ghana in the 1960s, Nimeiri in Sudan in the 1970s, and Mugabe in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. However, it is difficult to distinguish this (alleged) form of arbitration from hegemonic control. In a competitive political system, by contrast, internal arbitration can be performed by a pivotal political party, one judged to be able to perform a cross-ethnic coalition. The contending factions to be sufficiently disinterested by the other Alliance party has long sought to perform this function, without success, in Northern Ireland; and the Indian Congress party has continually claimed to be a reasonable arbiter of conflicts in India's regions, a

48 Blacks in the United States welcomed the intervention of federal troops to replace Arkansas state troopers at Little Rock in 1957, just as native Canadians welcomed the intervention of federal troops to replace Quebec provincial police at Oka in 1990.

claim that has become steadily more threadbare in the years since Nehru's death.

External arbitration by contrast suggests that conflict cannot be successfully managed within the relevant political system. It is a potentially useful conflict-regulating device during processes of decolonization, when an external power still possesses authority, but is less effective when the conflict zone is a strong sovereign state. External arbitration can be performed by a single external agent or state, a bipartisan authority, or a multipartisan force. Multipartisan arbitration or cooperative internationalization, as originally envisaged for the United Nations' peacekeeping (and peacemaking) forces, has been performed with intermittent success in Cyprus and in parts of the Middle East and Africa, for example in Namibia. Except in cases of decolonization (like Namibia) UN arbitration is usually a sign that the relevant ethnic conflict is seen as insoluble and as a dangerous threat to the security of an entire set of states. There is truth in the cynical observation that "when the UN comes you know that your problems are with you for ever".[49] However, adjudication of international law by the International Court of Justice shows that there are instruments for multipartisan arbitration of ethnic conflicts, should we choose to develop them.

Bipartisan arbitration in its fullest form involves two states sharing sovereignty over a disputed territory[50] – in the form of a condominium – but it can also involve an agreement by a state that maintains sovereignty over the relevant region to consult with another interested state over how that region's government is conducted and to grant the external government a role as guardian of an ethnic minority within the relevant region. One example is the Anglo-Irish Agreement between the British and Irish governments, signed in 1985 (O'Leary and McGarry 1992, ch. 6). The Italian and Austrian governments in 1946 came to a similar agreement over South Tyrol, consolidated in 1992, ensuring the German-speaking community "complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants within the framework of special provisions to safeguard the ethnic character and the cultural and economic development of the German-speaking element" (Alcock 1970; Hannum 1990, 432–40). The Finnish and Swedish governments also

49 Churchill is said to have observed of the Balkans that it produces more violence than it can consume domestically, which is one reason why it has often been the site of external intervention (cited by Buchanan 1991, 2).

50 We have argued for the merits of this way of regulating ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland (O'Leary and McGarry 1993, ch. 8).

developed an agreement over the Åland islands – although this agreement in effect set up a Swedish canton within Finland, a canton with the right to prevent Finnish citizens from settling on the islands (Åland's landsting 1988). Other bilateral agreements between states over contested regions and national minorities existed in interwar Europe (Hannum 1990, ch. 17).

Cantonization/federalization

There are two territorial principles of macropolitical conflict regulation, cantonization and federalization, both of which can be used to manage national and ethnic differences in liberal democratic ways.

Cantonization might more accurately be designated as "communization" after the communes that operate beneath the cantons in Switzerland. Cantonization might also be considered synonymous with devolution organized on an ethnoterritorial basis. However, we prefer the term cantonization because unlike communization or devolution it is a term distinctively associated with the regional management of ethnic differences.

Under cantonization the relevant multiethnic state is subjected to a micropartition in which political power is devolved to (conceivably very small) political units, each of which enjoys minisovereignty. Although it is usual to discuss cantonization in the context of federalism – as the Swiss paradigm might suggest – the principle of cantonization is separable, in principle, from formally federal forms of government. Cantonization must be distinguished from mere administrative decentralization, common in unitary states: It is built upon the recognition of ethnic difference and allows for asymmetrical relations between different cantons and the central government. The democratic Spanish state, erected after the fall of Franco, which is formally speaking an asymmetrical form of decentralized unitary state, can be considered an example of relatively successful cantonization, with the notable exception of the protracted conflict in the Basque country.

Cantonization is an application of the fashionable idea of subsidiarity to ethnic relations: Decision-making power is managed at the lowest appropriate level of a political hierarchy. Cantons must be designed to create culturally homogeneous units where majority rule is practically coterminous with the self-government of all the relevant communities.[1] Where ethnic conflict is high the partitioning of ex-

[1] Cantons could be designed to achieve a very local form of power-sharing government between the rival ethnic communities, especially where communities are so intermin-

isting governmental units to create ethnic homogeneity is the operating administrative principle, as happened in the case of the Bernese Jura.

Cantonization decomposes the arena of ethnic conflict and competition into smaller more manageable units: It involves a negotiable form of "internal secession." Under "rolling cantonization" policing and judicial powers can be gradually devolved to those areas where the population expresses a wish to exercise such powers and where it is judged that the experiment had some prospects of success. In the newly independent state of Bosnia a carefully designed and agreed-upon form of cantonization might have made a great deal of sense and prevented the possibility of extensive bloodletting between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. However, cantonization is fraught with potential difficulties, notably the drawing and policing of appropriate units of government, winning consent for them, and the ever-present threat that the cantonization of policing and judicial powers might be used by paramilitary organizations to seize control of parts of the relevant territories and treat them as "liberated zones." This danger might explain why the Bosnian foreign minister told a seminar that his government would not consider cantonization.[2] Yet cantonization is often as realistic, as pushing full-blooded nationalist positions, whether these be integrationist, secessionist, or irredentist. Cantonization is more gradualist in its implications than drastic repartition of state boundaries because it permits governments the freedom to reverse any experiments that go badly wrong. The Canadian government seems to be moving in the direction of cantonization after its recent recognition of the "inherent right" of native peoples to self-government "within the Canadian federation."

"Pseudocantonization" is also a possible political strategy, where territorial decentralization of ethnic conflict is used to facilitate or disguise control, and merits the condemnation of liberals and socialists. For example the South African government established a number of barren "homelands" for blacks in an unsuccessful attempt to delegitimise their demands for power at the center. Successive Likud governments in Israel (1977–92) refused to partition "Eretz Israel," instead offering a form of autonomy for the occupied territories that no genuinely representative Palestinian could embrace.

gled as to prevent neat partitioning: However, the logic of this system is really that of local consociationalism (see below).

[2] Address by Bosnian foreign minister at the London School of Economics, March 1992. In light of the European Community's ill-thought-out cantonization plan for Bosnia, which gave Bosnian Serbs what they regarded as a casus belli, the Bosnian foreign minister's skepticism has been justified.

Overlapping cantonization and federalism there exists a gray area of territorial management of ethnic differences that is often found in conjunction with external arbitration. International agreements between states can entrench the territorial autonomy of certain ethnic communities, even though the "host state" does not generally organize itself along either cantonist or federalist principles; for example the agreement between Italy and Austria guaranteeing the autonomy of South Tyrol or the agreement between Finland and Sweden guaranteeing the autonomy of the Åland islands.

Federalism is similar but not coterminous with cantonization as a device for regulating multiethnic states: The states, provinces, or *Länder* are usually much larger than cantons.[9] By federalism we do not mean the kind of pseudofederalism used to characterize the Soviet Union. In a genuine federation the central government and the provincial governments both enjoy separate domains of authority, although they may also have concurrent powers. The central government cannot unilaterally alter the constitution, which requires the consent of both levels of government. Federations automatically imply codified and written constitutions and bicameral legislatures. In the federal as usually disproportionally represented, that is, overrepresented.

Federalists maintain that if the boundaries between the components of the federation match the boundaries between the relevant ethnic, religious, or linguistic communities, that is, if there is a "federal society" (Stein 1968), federalism is an effective conflict-regulating device because it has the effect of making a heterogeneous society less heterogeneous through the creation of more homogeneous subunits. However, of the seven genuine federations in long-term liberal democracies, only three achieve this effect: those of Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland. The federations of Australia, Austria, Germany, and the United States do not achieve this effect, and therefore federalism cannot be used to explain the relative ethnic tranquillity of Australia and postwar Austria and Germany (where past genocides are more important). In the cases of Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland the success of federalism in conflict regulation, such as it is, is based upon the historic accident that the relevant communities are sharply segregated geographically. Federalism is less successful for communi-

9 Indeed the constituent units of federations can be subdivided into cantons to manage ethnic conflict. The current proposals of the Canadian government for the management of the Northwest territories envisage "cantonizing" the area to allow the various peoples of the Dene nation and nonnatives to exercise limited self-government.

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ties that, because of their geographical dispersal or paucity of numbers, cannot control federal units, as with Quebec Anglophones, Francophones outside Quebec, Flemish speakers in Wallonia, Francophones in Flanders, blacks in the United States, and indigenous peoples in Australia and North America. One reason why federalism proved totally insufficient as a conflict-regulating device in Yugoslavia was because there was insufficient geographical clustering of the relevant ethnic communities.

Geographically clustered communities accept federations for a variety of reasons. Federations have often evolved out of multiethnic colonies, where secession might have provoked conflict with those who wanted to keep the polity unified. Even if a history of common colonial government did not promote overarching cultural loyalties, for example through what Anderson (1983, ch. 4) calls "administrative pilgrimages," it usually creates elites (soldiers, bureaucrats, and capitalists) with an interest in sustaining the existing regime's territory. Federal states can often be sold economically – they promise a larger single market, a single currency, economies of scale, reductions in transactions' costs, and fiscal equalization. Large federal states can also be marketed as geopolitically wise, offering greater security and protection than small states. Finally, the personal philosophies and dispositions of federation builders matter: The MacDonald-Cartier alliance in Canada and Nehru's leadership in India were critical in establishing and sustaining their federations.

Unfortunately federalism thus far has a poor track record as a conflict-regulating device in multiethnic states, even where it allows a degree of minority self-government. Democratic federations have broken down throughout Asia and Africa, with the possible exception of India – whose survival is partly accounted for by the degree of central control possible in its quasifederal system. Federal failures primarily occur because minorities continue to be outnumbered at the federal level of government. The resulting frustrations, combined with an already defined boundary and the significant institutional resources flowing from control of their own province/"state," provide considerable incentives to attempt secession, which in turn can invite harsh responses from the rest of the federation: The disintegration of the Nigerian federation was halted only through two million deaths. Because the ingenious federal engineering of the Nigerian second republic went down before a military coup the jury must remain out on the success or otherwise of democratic federalism in resolving Nigeria's ethnic dilemmas. India, the most successful postcolonial federation, faces secessionist movements in Kashmir and Punjab, and Canada is

perennially threatened with the secession of Quebec (although this, like Godot, never comes). Even the sham federations of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union provided various nationalist movements with the resources to launch successful secessions during 1991–2. The threat of secession in federations is such that Nordlinger (1972, 32) excludes federalism from his list of normatively defensible conflict-regulating practices. Integrationist nation builders in Africa have distrusted federalism precisely for this reason.

Federations have been especially fragile in biethnic societies. With the possible exception of Belgium there is not a single case of successful federalism based upon dyadic or two-unit structures (Vile 1982). Even the Belgian federation technically has four subunits, although it is built around a dualist ethnic division, and the European Community has helped sustain the unity of Belgium.

Even relatively successful multiethnic federations appear to be in permanent constitutional crises. Not only does the division of powers need to be constantly renegotiated as a result of technological advances, economic transformations, and judicial interventions, but to maintain stability, supplemental consociational practices are often required at the federal and subcentral levels of government.

However, despite the difficulties associated with it, genuine democratic federalism is clearly an attractive way to regulate ethnic conflict, with obvious moral advantages over control. The argument that it should be condemned because it gives rise to secession and civil war can be sustained only under two circumstances. First, if in the absence of federalism, there would be no secessionist bid and if it can be shown that ethnic conflict can be more justly managed by alternative democratic means; and second, if the potential secessionist unit would be likely to exercise hegemonic control (or worse) over its indigenous minorities.

Consociation or power sharing

Political relationships can be organized between communities to prevent conflict according to *power-sharing* or *consociational* principles. These principles can operate at the level of an entire state or within a region of a state characterized by ethnic conflict: They are relevant to both central and local governments. Consociational principles were invented or reinvented by Dutch politicians from 1917 until the 1960s and by Lebanese politicians between 1943 and 1975. Malaysian politicians experimented with consociationalism between 1955 and 1969;

Fijians, on and off between 1970 and 1987; and Northern Irish politicians, for a brief spell in 1974.

Consociational democracies usually have four features (Lijphart 1977):

- A grand coalition government incorporates the political parties representing the main segments of the divided society or there is *government by more than a simple majority* that guarantees representation for ethnic minorities;

- *Proportionality rules* apply throughout the public sector; that is, each community is proportionally represented in the legislature(s), the executive, the judiciary, the civil service, and the police; that is, in the core institutions of the liberal democratic state. Proportionality applies both to public employment and public expenditure – each community gets its fair share of public expenditure, for example to fund its educational and broadcasting needs. Proportionality might also apply to private sector employment, requiring employers to have balanced workforces to prevent or correct ethnic discrimination in employment.

- *Community autonomy* norms operate in consociational systems. Each community is given self-government over those matters of most profound concern to them. In most cases these issues revolve around language, education, religion, culture, and expression of national identity. Ideally community autonomy differs from autonomy under federal systems because members of each community have their autonomy respected irrespective of where they live and work. One can think of it as "community federalism," or "corporate federalism," in contrast to territorial federalism. The most obvious examples of the principle are denominationally or linguistically organized education systems.

- They entrench constitutional *vetoes* for minorities. These vetoes can take various forms. For example, in Belgium weighted majorities are required before some legislation becomes law. Vetoes can also be legally entrenched.[34] Bills of rights are established, with supreme courts to uphold them, and if these bills entrench individual as well as communal

[34] In Canada, before the adoption of its new constitution in 1982, Quebec had an informal veto over constitutional change. Quebec's loss of this veto is one of the factors underlying Canada's current constitutional crisis.

rights, they can provide an effective way of entrenching minority rights."[11]

Consociational principles are based upon the acceptance of ethnic pluralism. They aim to secure the rights, identities, freedoms, and opportunities of all communities, and to create political and other social institutions that enable them to enjoy the benefits of equality without forced assimilation. They do not oblige people to be schooled or housed together, although they do imply a commitment to proportionality in political and legal institutions and possibly to proportionality in economic work organizations because these arenas are the ones in which ethnic differences are likely to produce violence, instability, and perpetuation of conflict. In some zones of conflict the relevant populations effectively have a simple choice between creating consociational democratic institutions or having no meaningful democratic institutions at all. A case in point is Lebanon, whose delicate consociational compromise was destabilized by Israel and Syria in 1975–6 and by the impact of the Palestinian diaspora.

Consociational arrangements do not require academic experts or consociational engineers to come into being: They are constantly reinvented by politicians. The key thing, according to Lijphart, is that politicians have the autonomy, imagination, and incentives to construct such compromises and the appropriate external environment. By no means all consociational experiments have proven successful – as the cases of Cyprus, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland indicate – but some have. The best normative case for consociational arrangements is that they involve the self-government of the relevant communities and they are often better than the alternatives: majority domination, bloody partition, secessionist warfare, and the unthinkable options of forced population transfers and genocide.

However, consociational systems are easily destabilized. To work, consociational systems require at least three fundamental conditions.[12] First, the rival communities must not be unreservedly committed to immediate or medium-term integration or assimilation of others into

11 A controversial but interesting example of this phenomenon in the English-speaking world is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). It protects both individual and communal rights. From the perspective of Quebec Francophones the problem is that the Charter protects the individual rights of English and French speakers throughout Canada; preventing the Quebec government from protecting the French language in ways seen as discriminatory toward English speakers.

12 Detailed discussions of the circumstances under which consociationalism is likely to succeed can be found in Barry (1991), Lijphart (1977, 1985), McGarry (1990), McGarry and Noel (1989), O'Leary (1989), and Pappalardo (1981).

"their" nation or to the creation of their own exclusive nation-state. Nationality conflicts, based on the explicit embrace of integral nationalism, appear to have an irreducibly zero-sum character; people kill for the proposition that "one nation = one state." Preventing communities from developing full-scale, "integral" or exclusive national consciousness requires political elites either to downplay the state's national identity in a world in which the pressures to the opposite are very powerful or to develop an artificial and transcendent national identity, which may prove very difficult. Second, successive generations of political leaders must have the appropriate motivations to engage in conflict regulation. The leaders of the rival communities must fear the consequences of war and desire to preserve economic and political stability. They must, for example, believe they are incapable of governing on their own (or establishing hegemonic control). The motivations may be self-interested or high-minded, but without them there is no prospect of producing a consociational arrangement. The moment rival elites believe that the benefits of war exceed the costs of peace a consociational system is doomed. Third, the political leaders of the relevant communities must enjoy some political autonomy, so they can make compromises without being accused of treachery. If they lack confidence – for example because they are outbid by external irredentists or by rival leaders – they will not be prepared to engage in hard bargaining. This condition not only requires restraint on the part of external elites outside the affected area but also within the relevant communities. In addition to no majority ethnic party believing it can govern on its own, a consociational settlement requires that each community must be internally stable politically in a way that promotes compromise. This condition is most exacting and is made more excruciating by a fundamental dilemma in the constitutional design of democratic systems. Proportional representation systems, which go with consociational practices, create incentives for extremist ethnic leaders to compete for office, confident that they will not lower the overall support for their bloc, but then each minority's extremists will lack the incentive to moderate their demands. The dangerous phenomenon of outflanking – of Sharon outflanking Shamir or of Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist party outflanking the Ulster Unionist party – is latent in all proportional-representation-based consociational systems. But by contrast in plurality-rule systems, which dovetail neatly with control practices, a dominant party may have no obvious incentive to appeal to minorities – unless very special circumstances make a cross-ethnic ("catchall") dominant party possible.

If these demanding conditions are not present, as in Lebanon,

Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Cyprus, and Fiji, consociational experiments break down. An even more depressing conclusion is also possible. Consociational practices may work to calm ideological, religious, linguistic, or ethnic conflicts, but only if these conflicts have not become the bases of separate national identities. In other words consociationalism may only be practicable in moderately, rather than deeply, divided societies (Horowitz 1985, 571–2). This conclusion is not appetizing for enthusiasts of consociationalism in Burundi, Fiji, Northern Ireland, Malaysia, and Lebanon, and detailed consideration of the South African case provides solid grounds for being pessimistic about a consociational settlement, even if it were to be negotiated (McGarry and Noel 1989).

The taxonomy presented above is merely the first stage of a wider project. We believe it provides a clear map of the possible macropolitical forms of national- and ethnic-conflict regulation. The harder task is to see whether regularities in the genesis, stabilization, and breakdown of these forms can be successfully established. Even if they cannot we hope this framework can be developed to assist in appraising the morality, feasibility, and consequences of macropolitical strategies. The comparative evaluation of national- and ethnic-conflict regulation matters because we are all nationals or ethnics of one kind or another, even when we want not to be, and because our community relations are too important to be left to chauvinists.

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